Manufacturing Consent: The Modern Pandemic of Technosolutionism

IEEEIEEE Transactions on Technology and Societyeditorialjournalnon-peer reviewed

3 June

Citation: K. Michael, R. Abbas, R. A. Calvo, G. Roussos, E. Scornavacca and S. F. Wamba, "Manufacturing Consent: The Modern Pandemic of Technosolutionism," in IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 68-72, June 2020, doi: 10.1109/TTS.2020.2994381.

As our first issue of the Transactions went to publication, the COVID19 crisis fully gripped the globe. While this was not the first time that such a disease had threatened to keep the world at gridlock, very few of us could have imagined the full extent of the socio-economic impacts of a dynamic global pandemic zoonoses. In recent history, we can point to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) novel coronavirus epidemic first identified in 2003, as having infected humans in the Guangdong province of China in 2002. We then had the Asian highly pathogenic AVIAN Influenza (H5N1) virus making a strong resurgence in 2006, that was first detected in geese in China in 1996, with some sporadic infections in humans occurring in 1997 during a poultry outbreak in Hong Kong. Finally, the swine flu (H1N1) outbreak in 2009 which had an estimated 700 million to 1.4 billion confirmed cases (between 11%–21% of the global population), and concluded with a vaccine [item 1) in the Appendix]. Each of these diseases have had catastrophic impacts on people, supply chains, infrastructure, and the economy but none more than COVID19, also known as SARS-CoV-2. According to a situational report by the World Health Organization on May 5, 2020, there were 3 517 345 confirmed COVID19 cases and 243 401 of these eventuated in death (approximately 6.92% of confirmed cases) [item 2) in the Appendix]. When considering these statistics, we should also note such numbers as a proportion of the total global population.

At a time where we envisage the capability and rollout of 5G, fully autonomous and connected vehicles, anthropomorphized sentient robots, and a high-tech future incorporating brain implants for memory enhancement, we have been dealt a very harsh reality; that we are still vulnerable to the most fundamental of biological attacks, that of pandemic viruses. Some of the big questions being asked by everyday people are why do we not as yet have a vaccine available to administer given that it has been 17 years since the initial detection of SARS? How have we experienced shortfalls in the production, distribution, and availability of personal protective equipment (PPE), given some doctors and nurses have had to use garbage bags as a physical layer of protection or have had limited or no access to face masks, goggles, or gloves? Why can we still have our favorite goods delivered by Amazon “just in time,” and yet the fundamental essentials like hand sanitizer and other hygiene products like toilet paper are either unavailable or rationed? How can supply chains be maintained so they might remain resilient during emergencies and logistical flows continuous between different countries even during times of widespread constraints and outages?

While we have disruptive technologies at our disposal [item 3) in the Appendix], it seems we cannot sustain excessive disruption. No matter what we believe about the hope of technology, technology has always fallen short of its ability to “fix” things during a time of rapidly unfolding crisis. But we have always known this; technology is an enabler, it is not the singular answer to our woes. Technology may help to buffer suffering, but it is not a resolution for pain, and at times can be the cause for further anxiety. We have a Gig economy that breaks all the traditional rules of engagement but fails to act with agility during disasters. Wealthy companies at this very moment are becoming wealthier, while the many unemployed are seeking refuge while they wait for government benefits and wonder when their next cash inflow will become available and how they will pay their bills. In the U.S. alone as of April 2020, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 14.7% and the total number of unemployed was 23.1 million [item 4) in the Appendix]. That estimate is now said to be closer to 30 million unemployed.

Some have pointed to the potential for blockchain technologies [item 5) in the Appendix], to alter the way that business is done, others to incentivization schemes for pharmaceutical companies to invest in test kits and medicine that the world may never need but has to be stockpiled and ready for rapid distribution, but most have identified the weak prioritization of effort toward the coordination and processes of fundamental service offerings. While citizens are good at accessing information about their situation, the two-way feedback loop from citizen to government or from business to government is a lot more complex to achieve. There is a gaping hole in consultative processes, citizen participation beyond surveys and focus groups, and “town halls.” There is a gaping hole in the way citizens are able to voice their concerns, opinions, and direct feedback in response to government actions. Many citizens do not trust their government either, and are unwilling to engage directly with agencies. Issues, traditionally in the domain of health and science have become politicized and commentary in this space divisive. Some people may even try to brand editorial pieces like this one as being for or against certain government or political agendas. But what scholars studying the impact of technology on society can, and should do, is be focused on the development of responsible innovations.

One of the most significant problems today, is the multitiered structural issue of how government agencies at different levels communicate with their citizenry, and how best to address matters that arise in local areas. Who is listening to citizen needs at the coalface? How might cities especially respond? Those seeking to have government benefits satisfied, have to provide their address details and “register” proactively on a digital platform, but only if they are aware they must register first. Someone who is unable to receive instant relief via government payments, using electronic payment transfer, is certainly exposed in a way that the individual who can receive those payments is not. The effects of the digital divide are being intensified in a world where highly skilled knowledge workers are leveraging the benefits of digital technologies to migrate to a remote working environment, while unskilled laborers are unable to work. These issues arise at the grassroots, particularly if someone is to suddenly lose their employment and be unable to make ends meet, while supporting a family.

So, is it a matter of too much tech, and not enough coordination? In this editorial, we will briefly look on the potential for application-focused technology used to location track and contact trace citizens during COVID-19, as a means to allow the free flow of humans in society again, putting an end to self-isolation. We deliberately provide only a sweeping overview of the socio-technical issues that inform our discussion. This piece is meant to stimulate our readership to reflect on what has worked during this pandemic emergency thus far, and what has not. It also seeks to demonstrate how technology is used in the name of public interest, but may fall short given a multiplicity of reasons [item 6) in the Appendix]. We are being asked to download Apps to reduce the transmission of COVID-19, but it feels like a meme is at play “there’s an App for that,” and while we distill the real motivation behind such deployments and the technology’s effectiveness, the world is divided about the value of technology and the role it will play until a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available [item 7) in the Appendix].

Early discussions on how to use technology in the arsenal of response to both SARS and AVIAN outbreaks in the early to mid-2000s, demonstrate preliminary lessons that need to be heeded, by academics and telecommunications service providers alike. A variety of applications were created, from Sunday Telecom’s mobile alert for coming within 1 km of a SARS infected building, to electronic bracelets for international travelers within Asia (e.g., Singapore), to localized 30 day contact and trace applications for hospital staff and visitors of infected patients in Singapore [item 8) in the Appendix]. Tech-centric ideas for limiting the spread of the virus were considered at a time when 3G was just beginning to experience its wider rollout, and social media was still in its embryonic stages (e.g., Twitter launched in March 2006 and by year-end Facebook had 12 million users). The novel coronavirus is the first real opportunity since the explosion of smartphones, 4G, social media, and cloud computing to demonstrate the stealth of a truly digitally transformed society. It is an opportunity to show if and how technology can support human autonomy and wellbeing [item 9) in the Appendix]. But we have had a moment of clarity.

Not everyone owns a smartphone; not everyone owns a feature phone. Some people share their smartphones, some have no mobile data and only connect through Wi-Fi in locations where it is freely available, and some people do not roam with their devices physically attached to their apparel. People have different software versions on their smartphones, and some people never update their devices because they seldom turn them off. People do not always know how to download a piece of software and then install it, and some people cannot read the instructions, privacy policies, and security notices. Some people do not have fingers or hands, and some people cannot see. Worse still, we threaten society with anklet bracelets when they do not comply to self-isolation orders [item 10) in the Appendix]; we tell them we will use automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) to spot their vehicles if they travel during restrictions [item 11) in the Appendix], and we consider using AI-based facial recognition for those in urban centers using mobile CCTV [item 12) in the Appendix]. Some people fear health surveillance applications of any kind, they do not want to be singled out for their color, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or perceived ideological views. So who are the people who question these apps? Are they trouble-makers? The vocal minority? Individuals living with mental health issues? Nonconformists? Indeed, all of these labels and more have been used to stereotype members of society who just want an alternative. Almost certainly, they are those who may be issuing a call for due diligence, increased consultation, and adequate planning and testing in times of crisis, to ensure we do not forgo fundamental human rights and civil liberties while attempting to achieve an impulsive technological fix to a health challenge.

Some nation states are location tracking using Global Positioning Systems or network triangulation based on cell tower signal strength down to 10 m on average, others are geofencing when quarantine orders are in place, disallowing people to venture further than their home location without immediate action by law enforcement. Others are deploying Apps that have been built with private corporations, like Australia’s COVIDSafe. These Apps use Bluetooth sensors to conduct anonymous proximity tracing. They take a relative location between two devices, but not an absolute one based on a projection system incorporating longitude and latitude. The apps have come under immense scrutiny over their ability to accurately locate a device within 2 m, so that false positives are not recorded netting more than just the true “contacts” in one’s immediate proximity and not those up to 10 m [item 13) in the Appendix]. Governments have also worked with network providers to collect aggregated historical location data of its populace to consider areas of sensitivity in terms of communities of interest interacting physically, while other governments have considered predicting the spread of the virus, using big data and algorithms to monitor the behavior of COVID [item 14) in the Appendix]. In other instances, private corporations have taken matters into their own hands, offering operating system level solutions for contact tracing that are embedded in the platform itself. Google and Apple have formed an unlikely partnership to offer third parties APIs to access contact tracing capabilities to assist developers [item 15) in the Appendix], particularly in the case of the complex Phone iOS which has caused many issues given how Apple architects products for privacy. The claim is that it is easier to control something at the operating system level, whereas Apps need downloading, potentially frequent updates, and may be fallible in other ways.

What all these “solutions” have in common is that they have bypassed a public consultation process and fail to assess what risks society are willing to take in order to benefit from the affordances of technology. Furthermore, a crucial and accompanying educational component is missing, whereby the public is not sufficiently informed as to the purpose of these technological solutions, their realistic benefits and evident limitations. Is it any wonder that these technologies (whether network, device level, or app level) have been unsuccessful in attracting the masses? Singapore’s TraceTogether App reached 17% adoption; Australia’s COVIDSafe has been downloaded by about 1 in 4 adults; Russia, Israel, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and India were among the first to launch their tracking regimes, the latter with absolute precision [item 16) in the Appendix]. In South Korea, for example, smartphone users get location-based emergency messages that alert them when they are near a confirmed case of COVID-19 without the ability to opt-out of the messaging [item 17) in the Appendix]. There have been issues with this emergency response, which has been reactive, resulting in what lawyers call the “pacing problem”: the inability of law to respond in a timely fashion to the speed of technological innovation. But this is not only bad practice, propelling the polarization of society to take sides on whether to opt-in or opt-out of an untested technological solution, but can lead to a myriad of unmet expectations and the erosion of civil liberties. To appease the public who does not engage in groupthink or sheep behavior, there have been attempts by government and industry to address matters with respect to privacy sensitivities, chosen architectural security approaches, draft bills toward legislation, sunset clauses, and provisions for the end of an App’s usefulness, open-source code promised in full transparency, availability of design documentation and technical details such as protocols and communications, explanations of data retention on cloud computing servers and more. The issue to date has been, while a lot of governments have promised all this and more, very little has been forthcoming. Some courts have overthrown the right to track citizens during this emergency, putting an end to the native Apps, until cases are resolved and court rulings determined [item 18) in the Appendix]. Other schemes are open to security vulnerabilities, like the possible leaking of sensitive location details of confirmed COVID-19 cases [item 19) in the Appendix].

Perhaps among the biggest unanswered questions surround the lack of testing of operational scenarios—the evidence that justifies the proportional deployment of a mass market app that works. Show us a sample of the test data. Is it accurate? What percent of records are false positives, measuring people beyond 2 m interactions? What kind of obstruction is caused by the human body (water), metal, concrete, and marble for Bluetooth? How long does a device take to handshake with a nearby phone with the App installed? What of the explosion of Bluetooth devices and limited spectrum in most cities, the pairing of devices between headsets, phones, wearables, and external items like printers and vehicles? What about people who have implants and have had the app directly affect their diabetes pump or other “programmers” for those with deep brain stimulators, the issue of electromagnetic interference [item 20) in the Appendix]? What about those with roaming devices from other countries, when only specific country codes are acceptable to the App? Our environment is not homogenous. It is complex; it is indoors and outdoors, and somewhere in between. By relying on too much tech to make us safe, we find ourselves in insecurity, forgetting where we went and what we did because of a false belief that the “app is doing the hard work for us,” when it may not even be recording accurately, if at all. These concerns and possibilities should ideally be conveyed clearly to citizens prior to the release of any technology-based solution, to establish realistic expectations and allow for informed choices regarding usage [item 21) in the Appendix].

The concern remains, location tracking, and contact tracing are merely attempting to automate an age-old health surveillance process. Contact tracing in essence is a process of identifying, listing and following-up with confirmed cases and their corresponding contacts. It is an “after-the-fact” chronicle of persons you have come into contact with over a 14–21 day period [item 22) in the Appendix]. It is not a vaccine. It does not offer protection. It does not alone keep citizens safe. Contact tracing does not mean you cannot get COVID, it just means if you do, health authorities may be able to engage in early intervention and place suspected COVID carriers in quarantine, thus potentially reducing the spread of the virus. Security expert Bruce Schneier falls short of calling these efforts a waste of time in a recent blogpost, noting “I can’t see how this sort of app is valuable” [item 23) in the Appendix]. For true contact tracing to be effective there must be the commensurate number of public health workers on the ground in the front line, doing the manual follow-ups with identified confirmed cases, and ensuring that quarantine measures are being adhered to, and medical advice taken. It is fallacious to say that the App will do everything we need the contact tracing process to do, as an excuse to slash budgets for in-person health educators, claiming that technology will sort everything out “just like that.” Of course, it will not. One-to-one education is necessary to limit the spread of the virus, and the care process while admittedly costly requires human intervention. For many the rich data sources for COVID-19 once a case is confirmed is the individual themselves and their community of interest, inclusive of the family unit, places the individual frequents (e.g., the office), and social gathering locations. Most can reduce their physical footprints to 3 or 4 locations generally if working remotely and continuing to self-isolate, but this is set to change once people begin commuting again in large numbers.

Despite what we know about the richest sources of data not coming from Apps, private corporations are rushing to the aid of governments to help them fix their Apps that do not work for half the target population. Motivations in this instance are difficult to gauge, yet private companies are stating that their technologies are in the public interest and nothing more [item 24) in the Appendix]. As most have argued, the Gooples of this world “already” have location data about us, so why not just provide it to the government too? Here is the grandest challenge that has surfaced worldwide: “trust.” Trust in the data owner, trust in the service provider who stores the data, trust in the App to do what it claims to do and nothing more, trust in that it all works toward prevention [item 25), 26) in the Appendix]. Otherwise, what we have before us is a sophisticated plot toward “manufactured consent” [item 27) in the Appendix]; a model that pleads with the individual that if you want to be well again, then simply take this pill, only in the case of COVID it sounds more like: “if you wish to be free again, just download this App.” Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called it a “ticket” so “we [could] go about doing the things we love doing again.” Not more than ten days after the launch of the COVIDSafe App, telecommunications providers directly messaged Australian citizens with a download link to the official App [item 28) in the Appendix]. This supplemented messages stating categorically that the “App would be initially voluntary” which sent reporters into a spin at the launch of the App. Clearly, the Australian public have been subject to coercion, perhaps warranted depending on which side of the fence you sit on, but getting awfully close to a government claiming mandatory download, such as Singapore [item 29) in the Appendix]. But some other countries, Germany, Italy and the U.K., have gone one step further, claiming that the Apps download on a smartphone can act akin to a “digital immunity certificate” [item 30) in the Appendix], an idea that purportedly has emanated from the ID2020 Alliance [item 31) in the Appendix] made up of founding members Accenture, Gavi, The Rockeffeller Foundation, Microsoft [item 32) in the Appendix] and IDEO.ORG. Whatever the end solution, the drama continues to unfold and we are certain future papers will address the questions raised in this editorial.

It is vital that we move away from a manufactured consent model, and steer discussions toward the careful co-design of technological solutions. This would entail transparent and measured approaches to the design of Apps and other solutions serving in the public interest; approaches built on the foundations of consultative and participatory methodologies that would allow stakeholder interests and perspectives to be identified, explored and factored into the systems designed to support contact tracing and other COVID-related endeavors. If large efforts toward decentralized digital identities are meant to “save the refugees,” then who is asking the refugees about what they want? In many ways, the world has many “digital refugees” at present, those for whom access is either limited or impossible, in many ways growing layers of digital divides, beyond the haves and have-nots.

The four papers, we have published in this second issue of the IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society shed light on the importance of good design in technology systems. The first paper is an invited paper by the distinguished human computer interaction scholar Ben Shneiderman of the University of Maryland who begins his abstract with the wise words: “[r]esearchers’ goals shape the questions they raise, collaborators they choose, methods they use, and outcomes of their work.” In his paper, Shneiderman draws design lessons from AI’s two grand goals, which when simplified can be categorized as the “emulation” goal to understand human abilities so as to build systems that perform tasks, as well as or better than humans, or the “application” goal of AI methods to build widely used products and services.

The second short paper is led by Jason Borenstein of Georgia Institute of Technology together with H. P. Mahajan, Alan R. Wagner, and Ayanna Howard and is titled: “Trust and Pediatric Exoskeletons: A Comparative Study of Clinician and Parental Perspectives.” The paper surveys the perspectives of clinicians regarding pediatric robotic exoskeletons and compares their views with those of parents of children with disabilities. Applying Shneiderman’s conceptual framework, exoskeletons fall into the realm of “Application Goals.” Exoskeletons emphasize user-centered design that give a recipient a sense of being in control of their own movements.

The third paper is written by a team of five researchers from Germany and France. Leading the effort is Pawel Drozdowski from da/sec—Biometrics and Internet Security Research Group, in Darmstadt, Germany. The survey paper focuses on demographic bias in biometrics and can be seen as a continuation of the conversation begun in issue 1 of TTS by Krishnapriya et al.

The fourth paper is written by G. Pascal Zachary, The Wall Street Journal’s chief Silicon Valley writer from 1989 to 1995 and celebrated author of the 1997 book: Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. Zachary uses his journalistic flair to contribute a long essay that examines Digital Manipulation and the Future of Electoral Democracy in the U.S. The paper is timely, particularly because of the looming 2020 national elections. Zachary is a skillful writer who challenges us to think about the consequences of disinformation, manipulation of the masses, and the future of deepfakes. He reveals to us the extent of digital political gaming and brings into question our capacity as humans to see through the opaqueness into the future, without the commensurate tools to combat the onslaught of fake news.

Appendix

Related Work

R. Roos, Study Puts Global 2009 H1N1 Infection Rate at 11% to 21%, Center Infectious Disease Res. Policy, Univ. Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA, Aug. 2011. [Online]. Available: https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2011/08/study-puts-global-2009-h1n1-infection-rate-11-21
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation Report-106, World Health Org., Geneva, Switzerland, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200505covid-19-sitrep-106.pdf?sfvrsn=47090f63_2
C. M. Christensen, M. E. Raynor, and R. McDonald, What is Disruptive Innovation? Harvard Bus. Rev., Brighton, MA, USA, Dec. 2015. [Online]. Available: https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (May 8, 2020). Employment Situation Summary. Accessed: May 8, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm
M. O. A. Muhairi, Why COVID-19 Makes a Compelling Case for the Wider Integration of Blockchain, World Econ. Forum, Cologny, Switzerland, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/why-covid-19-makes-a-compelling-case-for-wider-integration-of-blockchain/
J. Gramenz, Reasons We’re Not Downloading App, Queensland Times, Ipswich, QLD, Australia, May 2020. Accessed: May 9, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.qt.com.au/news/reasons-were-not-downloading-app/4006827/
C. Timberg, D. Harwell, and A. Safarpour, Most Americans Are Not Willing or Able to Use an App Tracking Coronavirus Infections. That’s a Problem for Big Tech’s Plan to Slow the Pandemic, Washington Post, Washington, DC, USA, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/29/most-americans-are-not-willing-or-able-use-an-app-tracking-coronavirus-infections-thats-problem-big-techs-plan-slow-pandemic/
K. Michael, “Advances in e-Engineering and digital enterprise technology,” in Location-Based Services: A Vehicle for IT&T Convergence, in K. Cheng, D. Webb, and R. Marsh, Eds. London, U.K.: Prof. Eng. Publ. United, 2004, pp. 467–478.
R. A. Calvo, S. Deterding, and R. M. Ryan, “Health surveillance during COVID-19 pandemic,” BMJ, vol. 369, Apr. 2020, Art. no. m1373. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1373
J. Kagi and E. Laschon, Coronavirus Sparks WA Plan for Electronic Tracking, 10 Years in Jail for COVID-19-Related Crimes, ABC News, New York, NY, USA, Mar. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-31/wa-coronavirus-crime-plan-for-jail-terms-and-electronic-tracking/12104286
L. Chung and L. Vicentin, “Number plate recognition and cameras to identify, those who shouldn’t be out over Easter,” Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, NSW, Australia, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/number-plate-recognition-and-cameras-to-identify-those-who-shouldn-t-be-out-over-easter-20200408-p54i5m.html
C. Mihalcik, Senator Questions Clearview AI Over Coronavirus Tracking Plans, C-NET, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnet.com/news/senator-questions-clearview-ai-over-coronavirus-tracking-plans/
A. Crocker, K. Opsahl, and B. Cyphers, The Challenge of Proximity Apps for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, Electron. Front. Found., San Francisco, CA, USA, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/challenge-proximity-apps-covid-19-contact-tracing
B. Grubb, Mobile Phone Location Data Used to Track Australian Movements During Coronavirus Crisis, Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, NSW, USA, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.smh.com.au/technology/mobile-phone-location-data-used-to-track-australians-movements-during-coronavirus-crisis-20200404-p54h09.html
A. Greenberg, Google and Apple Reveal How COVID-19 Alert Apps Might Look, Wired, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-covid-19-contact-tracing-interface/
P. H. O’Neill, India Is Forcing People to Use Its COVID App, Unlike Any Other Democracy, MIT Technol. Rev., Cambridge, MA, USA, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1001360/india-aarogya-setu-covid-app-mandatory/
K. Kasulis, S Korea’s Smartphone Apps Tracking Corona Virus Won’t Stop Buzzing, Aljazeera, Doha, Qatar, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/korea-smartphone-apps-tracking-coronavirus-won-stop-buzzing-200408074008185.html
M. Lubell, Israel’s Top Court Says Government Must Legislate COVID-19 Phone-Tracking, ITNews, Sydney, NSW, Australia, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.itnews.com.au/news/israels-top-court-says-government-must-legislate-covid-19-phone-tracking-547253
A. Greenberg, India’s COVID-19 Contact Tracing App Could Leak Patient Locations, Wired, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/story/india-covid-19-contract-tracing-app-patient-location-privacy/
M. Watts, COVID-19 Tracker App Could Interfere With CGM Devices in Australia, Diabetes, Basel, Switzerland, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.diabetes.co.uk/news/2020/apr/australian-covid-19-tracker-app-could-interfere-with-cgm-devices.html
J. Boyd, “Australia’s contact-tracing COVIDSafe app off to a fast start,” IEEE Spectr., early access, Accessed: May 9, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/software/australias-contact-tracing-covidsafe-app
R. Abbas and K. Michael, The Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Won’t Log Your Location, But it Will Reveal Who You Hang Out With, Conversation, Carlton, VIC, Australia, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://theconversation.com/the-coronavirus-contact-tracing-app-wont-log-your-location-but-it-will-reveal-who-you-hang-out-with-136387
B. Schneier, “Contact tracing COVID-19 infections via smartphone apps,” in Schneier on Security, Apr. 2020. Accessed: May 9, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/04/contact_tracing.html
S. Nellis and P. Dave. (May 2020). Apple, Google Ban Use of Location Tracking in Contact Tracing Apps. [Online]. Available: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-apps/apple-google-ban-use-of-location-tracking-in-contact-tracing-apps-idUKKBN22G28W
L. Perusco and K. Michael, “Control, trust, privacy, and security: Evaluating location-based service,” IEEE Technol. Soc. Mag., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 4–16, Mar. 2007.
R. Abbas, K. Michael, and M. G. Michael, “Using a social-ethical framework to evaluate location-based services in an Internet of Things world,” Int. Rev. Informat. Ethics, New York, NY, USA, Dec. 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.i-r-i-e.net/inhalt/022/IRIE-Abbas-Michael-Michael.pdf
E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York, NY, USA: Pantheon, 1988.
AAP, Scott Morrison Urges All Australians to Download COVIDSafe App, Says It’s the ‘Ticket’ to Easing Restrictions, SBS News, Artarmon, NSW, Australia, Apr. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/scott-morrison-urges-all-australians-to-download-covidsafe-app-says-it-s-the-ticket-to-easing-restrictions
M. Hui, Singapore Wants All Its Citizens to Download Contact Tracing Apps to Fight the Coronavirus, Quartz, New York, NY, USA, Apr. 2020. Accessed: May 9, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://qz.com/1842200/singapore-wants-everyone-to-download-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/
A. L. Phelan, COVID-19 Immunity Passports and Vaccination Certificates: Scientific, Equitable, and Legal Challenges. London, U.K.: Lancet, May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31034-5/
ID2020. (2020). We Need to Get Digital ID Right. [Online]. Available: https://id2020.org/
Decentralized Identity: Own and Control Your Identity, Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE2DjfY