Just-in-Time Transnational Organized Crime
Citation: K. Michael, "Just-in-Time Transnational Organized Crime: Just Another Adaptive Supply Chain," 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS), Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2022, pp. 1-7, doi: 10.1109/ISTAS55053.2022.10227108.
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Abstract
There has been much research conducted on the theme of organized crime. Researchers have considered a variety of typologies of organized crime groups, discussed whether crime groups are organized or disorganized in nature, and provided evidence of organized crime through the use of case studies. This paper reviews previous literature in the domain of organized crime, taking the criminological view in focusing on transnational organized crime. The contribution of this article is in positing that modern day transnational organized crime groups can be likened to adaptive supply chain networks in electronic businesses that have the ability to deliver just-in-time processes and products. In essence, supply chains are the ideal metaphor to study organized crime groups that span several countries, where crime is conducted at a local level within a geographic region that has transnational implications in an end-to-end network. To some degree, organized crime group structures have evolved at the same pace as communications technologies. The internetworking paradox demonstrates how transnational organized crime groups now follow their medium of choice, the Internet, allowing for a seemingly disorganized group of individuals to come together to act in a highly organized and productive manner. In effect online and offline social networks of an illicit type are being facilitated by the growth in new technologies and applications. Furthermore, the wireless Internet has provided an adaptive capability that grants members of illicit networks additional stealth in carrying out criminal activities in a just-in-time mode of operation.
SECTION I.
Introduction
The definition of organized crime remains contentious because it has meant different things to different stakeholders over time. Does organized crime refer to illegal activities, relations between illegal organizations, how actors work together to engage in crimes, the infrastructure supporting crimes, or to the bricks and mortar of an illegal organization [1]? Depending on the definition embraced by a stakeholder, their unit of analysis (e.g. crime group under investigation), and the particular time the study was conducted, an analyst may well be led to believe that some organized crime is really disorganized in nature. The two typologies of organized versus disorganized crime are indeed antithetical but they do not and should not be considered exclusive perspectives. In a pilot study into criminal groups conducted by the United Nations in 2002, two-thirds were found to have properties of organized crime and one-third were found to have properties of more “loosely networked structures” [2].
The idea of transnational organized crime introduces yet another layer of disagreement in the literature. Are organized crimes local, global, or as one observer put it “glocal”? The influence of advancing information and communication technologies and the globalization phenomenon have meant that any “business” that transcends national boundaries should be considered transnational in nature. Today, almost all organized crime can be considered transnational or global [3]. It is important to note, that the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, does not explicitly define organized crime but does define an organized criminal group in Article 2(a) [4]. The debate on whether organized crime is really organized or disorganized in nature seemed to subside in relevance after the Palermo Convention was ratified given the global/transnational context. What is more relevant today is identifying the spectrum of typologies of organized criminal groups. It is a given, then, that some organized crime is organized while other organized crime is disorganized in nature.
SECTION II.
Defining Organized Crime
A basic definition of organized crime offered here, is the “operation of illegal business entities whose members are bound together because of their group interest and their desire to profit from illegal activity” [5]. The definition of organized crime is fluid; its meaning has changed over time, particularly over the last fifty years. For example, Lampe has collected more than seventy international “organized crime” definitions on his research page [6]. According to Fiorentini and Peltzmann the term organized crime has been used with various meanings by scholars and prosecutors in different countries: “[s]ome authors use it to define a set of relations among illegal organizations, while others use it to indicate a group of illegal activities performed by a given set of agents” [7]. There is limited agreement between policy makers, law enforcement officers, criminologists and sociologists in understanding organized crime and this is nowhere more noticeable than in the definitions given by each [3, p. 13]. In 1983, Peter A. Lupsha provided a fresh view on organized crime by claiming that it was a “process”. In his definition Lupsha emphasized “task roles and specializations”, “patterns of interaction”, “relationships”, and “spheres of accountability and responsibilities” [8].
A. The Organized Crime Group
In 1969, Donald Cressey defined the organizational criminal as occupying “a position in a social system, an ‘organization’ which has been rationally designed to maximize profits by performing illegal services and providing legally forbidden products demanded by the broader society within which he lives” [9]. According to the Australian Crime Commission members of organized crime groups come from a cross-section of the community: “[s]ome groups are made up of criminal associates with similar skills or interests. Others are made up of members from a single ethnic or family group” [10]. To some extent, these groups can be considered de facto social networks. In any case, the capabilities of criminals should not be underestimated. Today, criminal groups send their members to university and on training courses to acquire new or specialist skills [10]. Thus, an organized criminal group is a “structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” [2, p. 5].
SECTION III.
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
Traditionally, definitions have not emphasized the international aspect of organized crime but today international agencies that are globally inclusive have addressed this omission in their definitions. This has given rise to the concept of transnational organized crime (TOC), which has added yet another layer of complexity to the debate. Transnational organized crime is largely a criminological term, and there is disagreement in how crime should be viewed (local versus cross-border) [3, p. 23] TOC is slowly gaining acceptance in the public domain, as organized crime emerges in different cultures and countries: “[w]hile organized crime can - and, it appears, increasingly does- operate across national boundaries, this is not per se a distinguishing feature, merely a characteristic of a sub-group of organized crime gangs” [11]. Of organized crime today, Andreas Schloenhardt has stated that it is ubiquitous, “global in scale, and not exclusive to certain geographical areas, to singular ethnic groups, or to particular social systems” [12]. Wright also states that “organized crime has become a global phenomenon” [3, p. 206].
A. Transnational Crime (TC)
The concept of transnational crime (TC) which became appealing in the 1990s is more prevalent in the literature than that of transnational organized crime (TOC). It was coined by the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch during the 1970s: “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing laws of several states or having an impact on another country” [13]. In 1995, the United Nations identified eighteen categories of transnational offences [2, p. 4]. The offences listed included money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit arms trafficking, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public or party officials. These offences could only be counted as being truly transnational if the offences were initiated, conducted, or directly or indirectly affected more than one country. In short, an organized crime group will operate in more than one jurisdiction if they can profit from a given venture [3, p. 157]. And transnational crimes are those that by their very nature involve crossing borders as an essential part of the criminal activity. We can thus now speak of the internationalization of organized crime as law enforcement agencies report increasing criminal activity by aliens in diverse markets. The entry points for organized crime groups are now limit-less as members conduct border-less transactions and interactions [14].
1) Not Local or Global but Glocal
One of the most challenging aspects of transnational organized crime is how to collect information about criminal groups at both the local and global levels. At any particular point in time a given transnational criminal activity has a local dimension (e.g. provincial level within a nation) and a more global dimension (e.g. the supply source and demand end points). Such interconnectivity has been termed glocal by one analyst [15]. Consider the criminal act of migrant smuggling as defined in the Palermo Convention. Smuggling people involves many different countries: “those in which the operations are planned; countries from which the migrants originate; countries of embarkation; transit countries; and destination countries” [16]. According to Schloenhardt, organized crime and migrant smuggling can indeed be regarded a type of transnational business [16, p. 25]. The biggest misconception of transnational organized crime is thinking that locating the physical, geographic epicenter of the crime is enough to disrupt the whole criminal network. The locus of transnational organized crime is not simply geographic, there are many more logical domains from which transnational crime must be considered including the social, political and the economic [3, p. 203].
B. The Rise of Criminal Enterprises and Criminal Networks
As organized crime became “internationalized” in the twentieth century, through the globalization of transport and communications, so too did criminal groups become increasingly networked and global [3, p. 22]. For the FBI, the terms criminal enterprise and organized crime are used synonymously to refer to a “group of individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity… and have extensive supporting networks” [17]. Yet not all organized crime networks in societies resemble a structured hierarchy. Some criminal enterprises [18] are dynamic with loose structures that make them agile and difficult to apprehend [2, p. 6]. For van Duyne [19] the economic activities of organizing criminals could be better described using the notion of crime enterprises than a “conceptually unclear framework such as ‘organized crime”’ [3, p. 13].
Since the beginning of the 1990s organized crime groups expanded their dimension and activities worldwide. In doing so, criminal groups established international networks to help them carry out their activities remotely in both licit and illicit markets. They achieved their goals “by employing sophisticated strategies and diverse modus operandi” [20]. In 2001 Lippens referred to this as the “phase of transition” [21]. Today, we hear of the establishment of decentralized networks of transnational terrorism and crime [22]. These networks are far from centralized and are often regarded as disorganized in nature. Bruinsma and Bernasco in a landmark paper in 2004 describe the paradigm shift that has occurred recently from the traditional view of criminal groups as centrally controlled organizations to a view of criminal networks[3, p. 157].
“[T]he traditional image of organized crime as an activity that is dominated by centrally controlled organizations, with a clear hierarchy and strict division of tasks is apparently out-dated. Organized crime appears to be better portrayed as a collection of offenders and criminal groups that enter into collaboration with each other in varying combinations (Reuter, 1986; Fijnaut et al., 1998; Kleemans et al., 1998; Klerks, 2000)” [23].
Thus the concept of criminal networks has now become popular in the literature to describe the structure of groups of people who are involved in organized crime. Evans [8, p. 17] defines a criminal network as an “enduring association of criminals with a loose hierarchical structure. They range from networks which function as cartels through those that more closely resemble trade associations to networks that provide little more than contacts and access to particular expertise. Edelhertz and his colleagues call this type of organization a syndicate, which they define as a criminal cartel or trade association. We prefer the term criminal network because it appears, as we have argued above, that it more closely captures the loose structure of many groups that do endure but are more fluid and adaptable than the term “syndicate“ implies.”
SECTION IV.
The Disorganized Crime thesis
The disorganized crime thesis came to prominence with the work of Peter Reuter in 1983. Reuter studied illegal markets in New York and in his well-known book Disorganized Crime in which he discussed the Mafia and the illegal activities of illicit bookmaking, loan-sharking, and dealing in drugs he argued that “criminal activity was not subject to central management by… hierarchies nor by other controlling groups” [3, p. 15]. In short, he provided a fresh perspective on criminal groups, and stated that in general they were not really organizationally cohesive as had been portrayed by law enforcement agencies, the media, and the movies [1, pp. xi, xii.]. According to Reuter, organized crime in New York was more diverse and fragmented, the underworld was heterogeneous, “a network characterized by complex webs of relationships” [3, p. 15]. Reuter concluded that in his terms organized crime was in actual fact disorganized “because of the lack of structure and fragmentation of objectives” [3, p. 15]. Reuter questioned the very core notion of the so-called “visible hand” at work in organized crime versus the influences of the “invisible hand” [1, p. 2].
While it is true to say that from a sociological perspective, crime groups do resemble a social organization with social relationships, they do not follow the probable pattern of organization that one might expect to come across in a legitimate enterprise, public or private. Criminologists have recently adopted the perspective that at least in a formal sense, organized crime is not very organized at all [3, p. 14]. This perspective has gathered momentum through empirical studies conducted in American cities. These studies “cite a lack of centralized control, an absence of formal lines of communication, and fragmented organizational structures as evidence that what law enforcement agencies might regard as ‘organized crime’ is distinctively disorganized” [3, p. 14]. The fundamental argument here is that organized crime is not highly systematized. However, this essayist is cautious in drawing universal conclusions.
In 2002, Letizia Paoli also claimed that the term organized crime was in her words, “an ambiguous catchphrase”. According to Leslie Holmes, Paoli emphasized the inconsistencies in the literature, claiming that “most so-called organized crime is in fact very disorganized and small-scale, and will remain so. She further maintains that such major large-scale criminal organizations as do exist are often involved in legal economic activity, so that the term organized crime can be misleading” [11, p. 11]. For Holmes, Paoli and others like her (e.g. Bäckman 1998), often overstate their cases regarding the disorganized nature of crime, although there is some truth in their contentions. “Certainly, there is no universal agreement in the literature, or between organizations dealing with this phenomenon, on how to define it” [11, p. 11]. According to the expert account of Alan Wright, “the question of the extent to which organized crime is “organized” is at the heart of any attempt to understand the concept” [3, p. 203]. Wright is wary of those who claim that the majority of organized crime is really disorganized. He points to the limited analysis on the subject and of the narrow definition of organization often provided by commentators. For Wright the discussion should have more to do with the activities organized by criminal groups, than the substance of their organization.
SECTION V.
Transnational Organized Or Disorganized Crime?
To categorically state that transnational organized crime is either only organized or only disorganized is to ignore the complexity of the subject which in Shelley’s words, “does not permit the construction of simple generalizations” [24]. In support of Shelley, Schloenhardt states [16, p. 208]:
“there is no single model of transnational organized crime… The structure of criminal organizations depends on multiple factors, such as: the accessibility and barriers of illegal markets; the number of competitors; pricing and marketing strategies of different organizations; and their attitude towards the use of threats and violence.”
While traditionally, organized crime groups have been hierarchical and highly structured, as they have moved operations across borders they have had to change. Facilitated by technological innovations, particularly in communications, transnational organized crime groups have become more flexible, operating in networks, that bring criminals closer together based on ethnicities, skills and interests [25]. To some degree transnational organized crime groups [26] can be likened to modern day “virtual teams” which consist of:
“a group of individuals who work across time, space, and organizational boundaries with links strengthened by webs of communication technology. They have complementary skills and are committed to a common purpose, have interdependent performance goals, and share an approach to work for which they hold themselves mutually accountable” [27].
The debate over whether organized crime is indeed organized or disorganized may well be dissipating. While authors like van Duyne are right to believe that organized crime is “diverse, varied and contestable” [19], the organized nature of crime should not be dismissed altogether. A group that is disorganized cannot achieve its goals effectively or efficiently. A disorganized enterprise is “one lacking order or methodical arrangement or function” [28]. Crime is still very much organized according to Wright, or at least as he proclaims, subject to the organizing abilities of sentient beings. Research findings are still divided into the two contrasting schools of thought: either organized crime groups have rational structures or they have loose confederations [3, pp. 36-7]. It is important to note that a landmark study that surveyed 40 organized crime groups over 16 countries, conducted by the United Nations in 2002 clearly showed that varying levels of both transnational organized and disorganized crime co-exist [2]. In fact, broadly, five typologies can be used to describe transnational crime.
A. Of Typologies and Hierarchies in Criminal Groups
There are generally five organized crime typologies now prevalent in the literature these include: (1) standard hierarchy, (2) regional hierarchy, (3) clustered hierarchy, (4) core group and (5) criminal network. Generally authors regard standard and regional hierarchy as being organized in nature, the core group and criminal network to be disorganized in nature, and the clustered hierarchy to oscillate between organized and disorganized group forms. In terms of organized crime the standard hierarchy is a single group with strong internal systems. The “regional hierarchy” differs from the “standard hierarchy” in that while maintaining strong internal lines of control and discipline, it is relatively autonomous in its regional components. In terms of “disorganized crime” the core group is an unstructured group despite it having relatively tight organization. It is often surrounded by a network of individuals who are engaged in criminal activities. The criminal network is the most loose, and is a fluid network of individuals drawing on people with specific, often scarce skills. Members of disorganized crime groups are career criminals who tend to move from one criminal project to another. The neutral position, considered to be organized or disorganized is held by that typology called clustered hierarchy where a set of more than one criminal group with established coordination and control can range from weak to strong [2].
1) Of Wheel and Chain Networks and of Nodes, Hubs and Cells
In 2007, Michael Kenney provided an invaluable addition to the literature on transnational organized crime with his book From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation where he likened terrorist networks to drug trafficking networks [29]. While Kenney does not talk in terms of typologies, he does provide a comprehensive view of modern TOC networks. For Kenney, TOC is increasingly becoming network-centric, away from “centralized hierarchies that feature tight coupling between units and formal decision making hierarchies” and toward the use of networks to “segment workers into loosely organized, functionally specific compartments, minimizing potentially destabilizing contact between participants” [29].
The Columbian trafficking system contains two types of networks- wheel and chain. Wheel networks, are synonymous to hub or star networks, and contain “a core group that manages the overall enterprise and peripheral nodes that perform specific tasks” [29, p. 29].
“In wheel networks, capabilities are not evenly distributed… Core nodes, as befitting their central location in wheel networks, are multitask enterprises. They organize transactions among different nodes… core nodes serve as the steering mechanism for wheel networks, facilitating communication and coordinating relations among peripheral groups. If something goes wrong with a transaction, relations of informal accountability ensure that participating nodes will answer to the core, protecting leaders and investors from theft and other uncertainties.”
Chain networks in contrast coordinate end-to-end transnational drug flows and are decentralized and self-organizing [29, p. 31]. Chain networks:
“contain independent nodes that perform specific tasks and transact directly with other nodes without mediation and oversight by core groups. While some nodes may contain influential leaders, relations among different groups are characterized by horizontal rather than vertical accountability.”
The major difference between wheel and chain networks is how risk is shared among the members. Chains often lack mechanisms to share risk, and are often more susceptible to law enforcement counter strategies. Given this, some narcos have been led to further segment their operations into separate working groups, often referred to as cells. Cells are small in size, and are responsible for carrying out much of the day-to-day transactions [29, pp. 31-2]. These networks are generally flat with often single levels of management.
SECTION VI.
Technology Shaping Transnational Organized Crime
A. The Supply Chain Theory
When referring to transnational organized crime, one cannot help but to think of the transnational companies that have fueled globalization and new technologies. In the 1970s, companies increasingly began to establish bases internationally as communications and trade networks grew in sophistication. Some of these corporations were also known as “multinationals” or as the “international corporation”. This was a part of the wave of globalization, considered by some economists to be contributing to the formation of a new world order [30]. As the number of transnational companies grew, so did the nature of the business, from traditional linear supply chain networks to highly meshed and dynamic supply chain networks. In his book, Kenney [29, p. 148] describes interorganizational networks that contain multiple nodes spread out across numerous countries to describe how some terrorist groups function. In similar vein, others speak of the internationalization of organized crime [31].
In typical economic analyses, transnational organized crime can now be considered a type of supply chain/value chain business process. Alan Wright is one author who makes this explicit connection [3, p. 89]:
“Readers will note that ‘value’ or supply chain encompasses both the support activities of the firm and the primary activities that produce its final products. Support activities include the infrastructure of the business, its financial and planning systems, human resources and technology. Its primary activities include ‘inbound logistics’. These consist of materials, money, time and information. The business operates on these to generate its products. Outbound logistics take the products to the customers, aided by the activities of marketing, sales and service. The effective working of both support and primary activities produces a profit margin for the business.”
Evans [32] is supportive of this explanation by including indirect stakeholders in the supply chain of illicit networks such as lawyers and accountants who provide the capacity for money laundering and tax evasion. Wright presents his thesis by describing in detail the highly networked nature of the illicit drug trade [3, p. 91]:
“Some members of the network provide the labor and time to harvest or obtain the raw materials. Producers and refiners make the basic product and convert it into a usable commodity. Outbound logistics include distributors and couriers (‘mules’) who may or may not be a permanent part of the crime group that is organizing the trade. Minimization of the size of the product is an important function to make it suitable for concealment. Each stage adds value to the product, thus enhancing profitability. Marketing and retailing are separate from the wholesale element. Wholesalers may adulterate the product with other substances at this stage, again to maximize profitability. Interestingly, both primary and support activities include legal and illegal services… Organized criminal groups may sometimes subcontract all or part of illicit services to people who are not strictly part of their ‘core’ group.”
Kenney [29, pp. 27-8] also uses concepts embedded in supply chain theory to describe illicit networks. He uses terms like “commercial transactions”, “transnational commodity networks”, “production”, “transportation”, and “distribution” in his analysis of Columbian drug traffickers. Kenney also acknowledges the role of communications in illicit networks when he states: “[e]ach trafficking group represents a node within a larger intergroup network that connects with other nodes through common objectives, shared experiences, and communication. Tasks among different groups vary according to their function in the larger network, which is often spread out in numerous countries.”
Others in the literature speak of dynamic networks [12, p. 28] but if one is to closely follow the developments in electronic business, today we can stipulate that adaptive supply chains are well and truly here. Members of illicit networks are not exempt from adopting modern supply chain management practices. The core idea of adaptive supply chains is the ability to manage the visibility, velocity and variability of information [33]. Managing visibility refers to the illicit network being able to sense changes to their supply chain and customer capabilities in real-time. Customers in this instance belong to the highly meshed value chain in the illicit network trade. Managing velocity is the next step to improving supply chain management that relates to a criminal enterprise or cell being able to plan and execute processes in near real-time. The final aspect of adaptive supply chains is managing variability which allows a criminal enterprise or cell to respond to change almost instantaneously. The first step to adopting adaptive supply chain practices is a focus on intra-enterprise integration to facilitate visibility within the organization. The next phase leading to adaptive supply chains involves collaborating and sharing information with other supply chain stakeholders. Once a criminal enterprise or cell progresses through these stages, adaptive supply chain management is adopted where transactional, operational, and financial data is shared throughout the supply chain to enhance network competitiveness and optimize network profitability.
B. The Internet-working Paradox
Globalization has been fueled by communications. The Internet more than any other technology has impacted the way legitimate and illegitimate activities are conducted throughout the world. There are many information technology observers that have studied how technology is shaping society. In this case, we may consider for a moment how technology is impacting transnational organized crime, or illegitimate business. The worldwide system of computer networks that is the Internet is a network of networks with no beginning and no end. It is highly meshed, complex and composed of large data centers known as hubs. A simple email message may traverse several countries before it reaches its destination. The paradox of the Internet is that while it is highly decentralized in nature, it has the ability to centralize operations, like modern day e-marketplaces and e-supply chains. To some extent the Internet metaphor is akin to Kenney’s distinction of chain networks which are end-to-end, decentralized and self-organizing, and to cells which are even smaller units of criminal membership.
1) Online Social Networks and Beyond
The Internet provides a platform for people and enterprises to exchange information, goods and services electronically. It provides global reach and makes it possible for small independent companies (often made up of sole entrepreneurs) to competitively bid for a part of a large-scale tender. In the same light, when considering the formation of illicit networks, the Internet can enable the dynamic capability to form inter-group membership within a very short time frame based on geographic location, skill-set, and product/process outcomes. The Internet also facilitates the real-time sharing of information between groups. Marc Sageman is one of the few authors to allude to this Internet-centric capability as related to crime groups [26, p. 161]. He refers to virtual communities which can also be likened to virtual teams in large corporate organizations.
“The Internet has also dramatically affected the global jihad by making possible a new type of relationship between an individual and a virtual community… The Internet creates a seemingly concrete bond between the individual and a virtual … community. This virtual community plays the same role that “imagined communities” played in the development of the feeling of nationalism, which made people love and die for their nations as well as hate and kill for them.”
There is no doubt that these online communities have aided the growth of the illicit network trade, as they are not only highly adaptive, but diminish the potential for detection by law enforcement.
Kenney describes the importance of offline social networks in his work without alluding to the power of social networks on the Internet [29, pp. 27-8]. He rightly points out that “[e]mbedded within… intergroup networks are interpersonal networks, based on participants’ family, friendship, geographic, and professional ties. Social networks play important roles… They generate trust and reciprocity among wary criminals… ” Increasingly, individuals and criminal enterprises are utilizing Internet-centric technologies and applications, especially those who operate under the guise of legitimate businesses. Online social networking applications such as Facebook, Twitter and lesser known online apps provide a platform for recruitment for criminal enterprises, even if the request for services does not happen online. Free Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications such as WhatsApp, Signal and Facebook Messenger provide illicit networks with evasive voice teleconferencing and textual chat capabilities while podcast and vodcast applications allow for the sharing of multimedia content that can be delivered in foreign languages or dialects adopting coded terminology for instructional purposes.
Bruinsma and Bernasco are justifiably critical that “… little use has been made of concepts and theories of social networks” in this domain [23, p. 79] but it can be argued that even less attention has been paid to the internetworkings of illicit networks on online social networks. How members of criminal enterprises interact with one another in a network setting could reveal a great deal about how criminal activities are planned, developed and executed - how criminal groups gather information, collaborate with one another, and share information towards a given outcome is also facilitated by the speed and reach of the Internet. With the rise of the wireless Internet, it has become increasingly possible to receive up-to-the-minute instructions via the use of affordable smart phones even in locations undergoing global development, and similarly to share near real-time information in the form of text, voice, image and video formats, all using private communication platforms, and even 3G and 4G, even in places where there was previously no wireline connectivity. Such use of telecommunications for illicit purposes is becoming increasingly difficult to detect and apprehend, particularly with the emergence of sophisticated encryption techniques that have even left law enforcement authorities wanting.
Mobile social networks have added yet another level of complexity to the fight against illicit networks as they grant individuals the power to remotely find one another using fake identities and personas, roam and conduct remote queries based on location or other specified criteria. In the near future emerging location-based social networks could conceivably bring together individuals who share expert profiles in the same domain and who are in the same area at the same time, making it even easier for illicit networks to conduct illegal electronic business in short bursts. While this does not mean that the criminal network is disorganized, it does mean that we can expect in the future for illicit networks to have the ability to be more flexible and adaptive with the types of activities they engage in, the way they execute on criminal activities, and the breadth of persons involved in criminally illicit behaviors.
SECTION VII.
The Role of Globalization In Modern Transnational Crime
Globalization can be defined as “the collapsing of time and space - the process whereby, through mass communication, multinational commerce, internationalized politics and transnational regulation, we seem to be moving inexorably towards a single culture” [34]. According to Findlay, the representation of transnational crime and its impact “are part of globalization”. Some scholars have even gone as far as to say that globalization is a facilitator of modern transnational crime. Globalization is a paradox and reflexive concept. It generates two opposing forces. At first it attempts to bring together people of all nations, to break down borders and barriers alike. Globalization is about coordination, integration and harmonization in a bid to reduce global insecurity by increasing knowledge sharing activities. Yet this same openness and interdependence enables “various risks to destabilize the international economy” [35]. For the greater part, modern transnational crime is piggybacking on global supply chains, as has been presented in this paper. This is how organized crime groups can quickly form, act, and then disband after fulfilling their objective. In short, these are adaptive supply chain networks.
Terrorist organizations engaged in transnational crime for instance, like any other transnational company, can take advantage of open markets, the global reach of customers, technological innovation, new recruits (of all backgrounds and talent), international financing sources etc. There is a type of convergence occurring between criminal groups, between crime types and between crime regions that has been facilitated by globalization. Some of these transnational crime groups also claim that their involvement in organized crime is a direct response to globalization pressures [34, p. 5].
Barry Buzan calls this the “dark side” of globalization, “where criminal organizations are said not only to have benefited from the increasingly open global economy, but to have developed powerful tools, techniques and relationships to thwart the state” [36]. Barrie Stevens calls this view the “flip side of the coin” where transnational organized criminal groups use the very same channels (i.e. transport and communications) [37] to conduct their illegal activities, as if they were legal entities. These channels are “vulnerable to abuse through theft, fraud, the trafficking of humans and animals, terrorist operations and so on” [37, p. 21].
In summary, there have been structural changes in transnational organized crime as a result of globalization and internetnetworking. Transnational criminal groups now reflect a typical business set-up [38] with established core competencies - they are cellular, small and flat as opposed to hierarchically structured, and focus on their strengths in a given service (i.e. transnational crime). The groups form temporary alliances, and form rapidly, so as to go undetected. Members of specific groups are also subcontracted, rather than recruiting permanent staff, analogous to the notion of virtual teams in corporations.
SECTION VIII.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that there has been a paradigm shift in the way transnational organized crime has been understood and conducted, especially since the 1970s. Today, despite disagreement in the literature there is at least some consensus in that a variety of typologies exist to characterize the nature of transnational organized crime. Yes, there are crime groups that can be considered to function in an organized fashion, and others by their very nature embrace a more disorganized way of working. Increasingly however, the traditional view of a strictly large hierarchical criminal group made up of a single family like the Mafia is being replaced by a view of loosely federated networks, much as has been witnessed in the formation of terrorist networks. Still, there is some contention on how the problem of transnational organized crime should be countered. Clearly organized criminals do not remain static and organized crime is increasingly becoming fragmented into small-scale cell-like structures. The challenge for law enforcement agencies in the future will be how to think both locally and globally (i.e. glocally), and how to counter decentralized disorganized crime. The difficulty will be in how to develop strategies to counter illicit networks that are increasingly beginning to mimic the communication technologies that they use, be it in the formation of virtual teams, which can be likened to social networks, adaptive supply chains that are common in electronic business settings such as e-marketplaces, and the wireless Internet which allows for increasingly dynamic behavior granting members of illicit networks high levels of mobility.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to thank Terri Bookman for her editorial support.
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Authors
School for the Future of Innovation in Society and School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
Citation: K. Michael, "Just-in-Time Transnational Organized Crime: Just Another Adaptive Supply Chain," 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS), Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2022, pp. 1-7, doi: 10.1109/ISTAS55053.2022.10227108.